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AMELIORATIVE RACIAL CLASSIFICATIONS UNDER
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE:
DEFUNIS v. ODEGAARD
Assume that an unsuccessful white applicant to a state university
discovers that black candidates with lower lest scores and grades are
being accepted for the entering class for which he has been rejected.
He brings suit against the university alleging a denial of equal protection
contending that he was denied admission solely because of his race.'
This hypothetical situation, posed in March, 1971, became a
reality five months later when Marco DeFunis, Jr., filed suit against
Charles Odegaard, the president of the University of Washington. The
University's law school had offered seats in the 1971 entering class
to thirty-six minority applicants2 whose test scores and grades were
lower than DeFunis' while DeFunis was denied admission. The sub-
sequent litigation and appeal' of DeFunis' case has now brought this
equal protection issue to the United States Supreme Court, and its
decision will assuredly affect all areas of contemporary race relations.;
1. O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing Access of Minority Groups to
Higher Education, 80 YALE L.J. 699, 706 (1971) (citation omitted).
HEREINAFTIER THE FOLLOWING CITATIONS WILL BE USED IN THIS
NOTE:
Andersen, The Admissions Process in Litigation, 15 AIZ. L. Ray. 81 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Andersen];
Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 83 HA'v. L. Rnv. 1065 (1969)
[hereinafter cited as Developments].
2. "Minority" within the context of this case refers to Black Americans, Chicano
Americans, American Indians, and Philippine Americans. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82
Wash. 2d 11, 18 n.3, 507 P.2d 1169, 1174 n.3, cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3300 (U.S.
Nov. 19, 1973) (No. 73-235).
3. DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741727 (Super. Ct. Oct. 18, 1971) as cited by
Andersen at 81.
4. There is no intermediate appellate court between the superior courts and the
state supreme court in the state of Washington. See WASH. CONST. art. IV, § 1.
In addition to DeFunis' brief, arguing that the United States Supreme Court
should note probable jurisdiction or, in the alternative, grant certiorari, and the law
school's brief, which sought the opposite result, an amicus curiae brief was filed by
Alexander M. Bickel on behalf of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, asking
the Court to hear the case.
5. For a discussion of other areas in which preferential treatment of minorities
has been, or could be, practiced, see Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World:
Equality for the Negro-The Problem of Special Treatment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 363
(1966); Comment, Constitutionality of the "Benign" Quota, 40 TENN. L. REV. 55
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The issue, precisely defined, is whether a state is permitted,
within the narrow confines of the fourteenth amendment, to single
out members of formerly oppressed minority groups for special, bene-
ficial treatment in the law school admissions context." The answer
to this question and the implications of that answer will be profoundly
affected by the standard which the Supreme Court chooses to apply
in reviewing the law school's minority admissions program. DeFunis
presents to the Court a racial classification unlike any which it has
previously examined. Therefore the first question facing the Court
is the similarity of that classification to previously examined racial
classifications which have been deemed inherently suspect. The Court's
choice of the proper standard of review must be based on this preliminary
decision. If the facts presented by DeFunis are significantly different
from those of the usual racial discrimination case, it may be that the ap-
plication to those facts of what have become the established legal rules
of racial discrimination is inappropriate: in a very real way, the Court
would be attempting to force a square peg of facts into an ill-fitting
round hole in the structure of the law. The purpose of this Note
is to examine the Washington Supreme Court's opinion in DeFunis
v. Odegaard to determine whether that court applied the appropriate
standard of review to the law school's preferential admissions program,




The Board of Regents of the University of Washington has the
power and the duty to establish entrance requirements for students
seeking admission to the University.7 This responsibility was dele-
gated to the Dean of the law school, who in turn delegated it to the
(1972); Note, Carter v. Gallagher: From Benign Classification to Reverse Discrimina-
tion, 34 U. PIar. L. Rv. 130 (1972).
6. The phrases most popularly used to refer to the practice of singling out
minority groups for special treatment are "preferential treatment" (or "preferential
admissions" in the context of higher education); "ameliorative classification"; "benign
classification"; and "reverse discrimination." The first two phrases most accurately
describe the purpose of such state action. The last two are not strictly accurate and
their use should be avoided because "benign classification" connotes a classification
which is detrimental to no one-a false assumption-and "reverse discrimination"
connotes the type of invidious discrimination which minority groups have traditionally
suffered.
7. WAsH. Rav. CODE ANN. § 28B.20.130(3) (1970).
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Committee on Admissions and Readmissions." The basic criteria for
selection were set out by the admissions committee in a "Guide for
Applicants" which accompanied each application:
In assessing applications, we [begin] by trying to identify applicants
who [have] the potential for outstanding performance in law school.
We [attempt] to select applicants for admission from that group on the
basis of their ability to make significant contributions to law school
classes and to the community at large.
We [gauge] the potential for outstanding performance in law
school not only from the existence of high test scores and grade
point averages, but also from careful analysis of recommendations,
the quality of work in difficult analytical seminars, courses, and writing
programs, the academic standards of the school attended by the
applicant, the applicant's graduate work (if any), and the nature of
the applicant's employment (if any), since graduation.
An applicant's ability to make significant contributions to law
school classes and the community at large [is] assessed from such
factors as his extracurricular and community activities, employment,
and general background.9
Implicit in these criteria, but not specifically mentioned by the com-
mittee in its pamphlet, was a university-wide policy which sought to
reduce or erase the effects of past segregation and discrimination
against disadvantaged ethnic and racial minority groups.' 0 This policy
8. The admissions committee was composed of five faculty members and two
students at the time of DeFunis' application but was enlarged on June 7, 1971 to in-
clude six faculty members and three students. It was apparently this enlarged com-
mittee which made the final decision to reject DeFunis' application. DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 15, 507 P.2d 1169, 1172 (1973).
9. 82 Wash. 2d at 16, 18, 507 P.2d at 1173, 1174. The committee also explained
that "[a]n applicant's racial or ethnic background was considered as one factor in our
general attempt to convert formal credentials into realistic predictions." Id. at 19,
507 P.2d at 1174. This statement raised an important issue not dealt with in this
Note, i.e., whether grade point average and standard test scores should be adjusted to
account for the culturally-deprived background of disadvantaged applicants. Propo-
nents of such practices claim that disadvantaged applicants are poorly equipped in
verbal skills, and that therefore their standard academic credentials are not accurate
indicators of their academic ability. Compare Bell, In Defense of Minority Admis-
sions Programs: A Response to Professor Graglia, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 364, 366-68
(1970) with Jensen, Selection of Minority Students in Higher Education, 1970 U.
TOL. L. Rv. 403, 440-47.
10. The president of the University testified at trial as to the origin of the policy:
More and more it became evident to us that just an open door, as it were,
at the point of entry to the University, somehow or other seemed insufficient
to deal with what was emerging as the greatest internal problem of the
United States of America, a problem which obviously could not be resolved
without some kind of contribution being made not only by the schools, but
obviously, also, by the colleges in the University and the University of Wash-
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was based on the belief that black Americans, Chicano Americans,
American Indians, and Philippine Americans still suffered the continu-
ing effects of past discrimination. 1 An explanation of the law school's
method of implementing these admissions criteria and policies will
provide the factual framework within which the legal issues were
decided. 12
In 1970-71 the law school received 1601 applications for 150
first year slots.' 3 An initial ranking was made by combining, by
formula, each applicant's junior and senior undergraduate grade point
average and his or her Law School Admissions Test LSAT) score
to derive a Predicted First Year Average (PFYA). The admissions
committee had determined that those applicants with a PFYA of 77
or above had the highest probability of success in their first year.
The committee also determined that a PFYA of below 74.5 indicated
little chance of getting through. Applicants in this lower group were
either summarily rejected or placed aside for further review in the
light of some significant subjective indicator appearing on the applica-
tion.'4 Applications from minority candidates were never summarily
rejected but were always referred to the full committee, regardless
of the PFYA.15
ington, in particular, given the racial distribution of this state.
So that was the beginning of a growing awareness that just an open
door sheer equality in view of the cultural circumstances that produced
something other than equality, was not enough; that some more positive
contribution had to be made to the resolution of this problem in American
life, and something had to be done by the University of Washington. 82
Wash. 2d at 20, 507 P.2d at 1175.
11. Asian Americans were not included since the law school could admit sub-
stantial numbers of this minority group without varying the standards used for the
admission of white candidates. 82 Wash. 2d at 18 n.3, 507 P.2d at 1174 n.3.
12. This Note will not attempt to judge the political or social propriety of the law
school's minority admissions program, but will confine itself to the legal issues, i.e.,
whether a state, if it desires to do so, is constitutionally permitted to implement such
a program.
13. The number of applications had increased from 618 in 1967 for the same
number of first-year positions to be filled. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d at 15,
507 P.2d at 1172.
14. See text accompanying note 9 supra.
15. Applicants who were applying for readmission after having been admitted and
then inducted into the armed services had a right to reenter if they reapplied imme-
diately upon completion of their tour of duty. Out of this group, twenty-two persons
were admitted with PFYA's lower than DeFunis'.
The records show that of the 1601 applicants, 776 (48%) had PFYA's below 74;
754 (47%), between 74 and 77; and 56 (3%), above 77. PFYA is not shown for
15 (1%) of the applicants. Letter from William R. Andersen, Of Counsel for the law
school, Oct. 8, 1973.
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DeFunis' PFYA was computed at 76.23, which placed him in
the group between the highest (77.0) and the lowest (74.5) cut-off
points.' 6 It was this middle group which received the heaviest subjec-
tive consideration. The file of each applicant in this group was ran-
domly assigned to a committee member who read its contents and
summarized them for the full committee. The summary included an
evaluation of both the objective and subjective data and often in-
cluded comments on any unique personal information contained in
the file.' 7  After discussion, the committee voted as to the dispo-
sition of each applicant, i.e., to accept him, reject him, or put him
on a waiting list. Through this complex and highly subjective ad-
missions procedure, DeFunis was assigned to a waiting list 8 and was
ultimately denied admission on August 2, 1971.' 9
16. DeFunis graduated from the University of Washington in 1970 with a junior-
senior grade point average of 3.71/4.00. He was denied admission to the 1970 entering
law school class, so he undertook twenty-two hours of graduate work for a grade point
average of 3.86. The latter grades were not figured into his PFYA.
Due to his rejection in 1970, and to his continued interest in law school, DeFunis,
by the time he reapplied for the 1971 entering class, had taken the LSAT three
times, scoring successively 512, 566 and 668. Pursuant to the law school's admissions
policy, the average score, not the highest, was used to determine DeFunis' PFYA of
76.23. The policy was based on the finding that repeated taking of the LSAT has an
educational effect which allows the applicant to achieve successively higher scores, to a
certain point.
17. Two examples of these summaries are:
Excellent recommendations, sound record. Divorced with five kids. Could
make it if her personal situation could be worked out, lightened load possi-
bility? Admit.
. . . Overall GPA 2.85. [S]trange recommend[ations, e.g.,] "arrogant, con-
ceited" but apparently bright. . . . Take a chance on his screwy personality
& admit. 82 Wash. 2d at 57, 507 P.2d at 1195 (Hale, C.1., dissenting).
Chief Justice Hale was especially critical of this method of evaluating the applicants.
He pointed out that the student members were not specially qualified to make ad-
missions judgments, and that some of their judgments were apparently founded on a
sympathy for those applicants engaged in "activist" community work. Id. at 52-59, 507
P.2d at 1193-96. Moreover, the evaluation seemed to follow no logical pattern and an
examination of the files "fails to show any consistent policy on admissions at which a
prelaw student could aim his career." Id. at 59, 507 P.2d at 1196.
18. The admissions committee also ranked those candidates assigned to the wait-
ing list into four groups of roughly equal size. DeFunis-with thirty-two others-
was ranked in the bottom quartile, the group least likely to receive offers of ad-
mission.
19. Of nine applicants with a PFYA of 76.23, two were granted admission. An-
dersen at 84.
Along with this rejection, however, DeFunis could count his four acceptances
from the law schools at the University of Oregon, the University of Idaho, Gonzaga
University, and Willamette University. 82 Wash. 2d at 30 n.11, 507 P.2d at 1181 n.11.
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Minority applicants were accorded different treatment, however.
Their files were always assigned to particular members of the admis-
sions committee: applications from black Americans were committed
to a faculty member who had prior experience in minority admis-
sions2" and to a black student committee member; applications from
other minority candidates were initially reviewed by an associate dean
who later presented his findings to the full admissions committee.
21
For its part, the committee compared each minority candidate with
other minority applicants-not with non-minority candidates-and in
general sought those minority applicants whom it believed would be
capable of completing the law school program. If the committee felt
that a minority applicant could get through the first year, that applicant
was offered admission.2
The major result of the admissions procedure-at least from De-
Funis' viewpoint-was that he, with a PFYA of 76.23, was not ad-
mitted, while some thirty-six minority applicants with lower PFYA's
were offered seats in the entering class.23
In August, shortly after receiving his rejection letter, DeFunis
filed suit in the superior court of King County, Washington, against
almost everyone who might have been connected with the admis-
sions process.14  The complaint alleged three general causes of action25
20. Professor Geoffrey Crooks was the 1970 summer director of the law school's
Council of Legal Education Opportunities (CLEO) program, a federally funded pro-
gram sponsored by the American Bar Association, the American Association of Law
Schools, the National Bar Association, and the Law School Admissions Council, which
provides summer training and financial aid to disadvantaged college students seeking
admission into a law school. 82 Wash. 2d at 19 n.4, 507 P.2d at 1175 n.4. For a re-
port on the experience of some of these summer programs, see Symposium: Disadvan-
taged Students and Legal Education-Programs for Affirmative Action, 1970 U.
TOL. L. REv. 277, 633-808.
21. 82 Wash. 2d at 19, 507 P.2d at 1175.
22. It is crucial to remember that minority applicants who were admitted were
certainly qualified in the absolute sense, but were less qualified than some nonminor-
ity candidates when judged by traditional academic standards.
23. One-half of the thirty-six minority admittees actually enrolled in the first-
year class. Twenty-nine other applicants in DeFunis' situation were similarly denied
admission. The highest PFYA of the 1971 entering class was 80.01; the median
PFYA was 76.61. Letter from William R. Andersen, Of Counsel for the law school,
Oct. 8, 1973.
24. The parties defendant included the board of regents, the president, the registrar
of the university, the dean of the law school, and two faculty members of the admis-
sions committee. Andersen at 85 n.5.
25. They were: (1) the law school had admitted many candidates whose PFYA's
were lower than DeFunis'; (2) the law school had unjustly discriminated against resi-
dent taxpayers by accepting non-taxpaying non-residents; and (3) the law school had
given DeFunis misleading advice concerning his attempt to gain admission. Id. at
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and prayed for an order that the defendants admit and enroll DeFunis
in the law school in the fall of 1971.26 DeFunis argued that he had
been denied the equal protection of the laws because the law school
had used race as an admissions criterion. Defendants responded that
the use of race in structuring the admissions classifications was done
in the pursuit of legitimate state purpose-i.e., improving the quality
of the educational process and increasing the number of minorities
in the legal profession-and therefore did not violate the fourteenth
amendment.17  A brief survey of contemporary fourteenth amendment
jurisprudence is necessary for a clear understanding of the state supreme
court's decision on this issue.
LEGAL BACKGROUND: THE Two LEVELS OF REVIEW
The fourteenth amendment provides in part: "No state shall . . .
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." The judicial construction of this constitutional mandate has cen-
tered on an examination of the ways in which persons are classified by the
state.28 The Supreme Court has decided, and repeatedly affirmed,
that when a state treats persons unequally because of their race,"'
national origin,30 or alienage,31 these classifications are constitutionally
85-86. The first cause of action was stated in general terms and did not specifically
allege that the minority admissions program was responsible for the acceptance of less
qualified applicants and the rejection of DeFunis. This subject was first broached
during discovery, see id. at 88, and the equal protection issue was not presented to
the trial court until after the trial was in progress. Id. at 89.
26. 82 Wash. 2d at 13, 507 P.2d at 1172. DeFunis asked in the alternative that
he recover $50,000 in damages allegedly caused by the projected increased living ex-
penses in an out-of-state law school, the loss of his wife's income for the three years
of law school, and the inherent handicaps he would face in an expected law practice in
Washington because he was not trained in the state. Andersen at 85 n.10. Early in
the proceedings the trial court dismissed this claim for money damages. 82
Wash. 2d at 14, 507 P.2d at 1172.
27. Andersen at 89.
28. A classification may be explicit, see Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957);
implicit, see Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); or may arise from
the enforcement of a statute or ordinance, see Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356
(1886).
For a comprehensive survey of equal protection precedent through 1969, see
Developments.
29. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964); cf. Bolling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
30. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
31. See In re Griffiths, 93 S. Ct. 2851 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 93 S. Ct.
2842 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish & Game
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suspect s2 and must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny.3 3 Unless
the Court finds that these suspect classifications are necessary for the
accomplishment of some overriding state objective, the classification
will be held in violation of the fourteenth amendment equal protection
clause.84 The burden of justifying the use of a suspect classification
is so heavy that no state has ever been able to justify a suspect classi-
fication to the satisfaction of the Supreme Court; the federal govern-
ment has succeeded only twice.35 A similarly strict standard of review
is applied to classifications which impinge upon "fundamental" rights
or interests, which include voting, 6 procreation, 7 marriage,33 travel,39
and fair criminal procedure.40 In this situation the Court has required
the state to show that the classification is necessary to accomplish a
"compelling state interest,"41 and that less onerous alternatives are un-
available.42
The standard developed to examine classifications which are sus-
pect or which infringe upon fundamental interests is commonly called
the "higher standard of review" or the "strict scrutiny standard."4
Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948). But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 93 S. Ct. 2842, 2861
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (alienage is not a suspect criterion).
32. See, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971); Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
33. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973); Loving v. Vir-
ginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
34. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 93 S. Ct. 2851, 2855 (1973); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 192, 196 (1964);
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
35. The federal government is bound by the same standard when it classifies
people into groups, see Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954), but it was able to
sustain the heavy burden of justification in two cases in which the exigencies of war-
time demanded discriminatory treatment of Japanese-Americans during World War 11.
See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (exclusion from designated
areas); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (curfew regulations).
36. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
37. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
38. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (classification also based on race,
a suspect criterion).
39. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
40. See, e.g., Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.9 12 (1956).
41. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342 (1972).
42. See id. at 343.
43. Although the Court has required the state to show an "overriding" or "sub-
stantial" state purpose to justify classifications which are suspect and has spoken of a
"compelling state interest" when fundamental rights were involved, this difference is
purely semantic; the Court has required the same showing in either situation. See, e.g.,
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (a fundamental-interest decision citing Kore-
matsu, a suspect-classification decision). Moreover, a recent Supreme Court footnote
has ratified this implicit understanding: "The state interest required [under the higher
1133
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In reviewing all other state actions which classify people into
groups, the Court is more lenient.4 4  The classifications are accorded
a presumption of constitutional validity and the Court requires only
that they bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. '
This standard of review has commonly been referred to as the "lower
standard of review" or the "rational-basis standard."
With this two-tiered framework of review in mind, but before
proceeding to the trial and appeals opinions in DeFunis, it would be
appropriate to review the case of Brown v. Board of Education,4 which
figured heavily in these decisions.
Brown, the landmark Supreme Court decision which overruled
the "separate but equal" doctrine announced in Plessy v. Ferguson,
47
standard] has been characterized as 'overriding,' 'compelling,' 'important,' or 'sub-
stantial.' We attribute no particular significance to these variations in diction." In re
Griffiths, 93 S. Ct. 2851, 2855 n.9 (1973) (citations omitted).
44. It was recently stated that these actions might be classified as operating in
the area of "economics and social welfare," Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
485 (1970), but in actuality they include all those classifications which do not involve
suspect criteria, or impinge upon fundamental interests.
45. E.g., Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972), quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971).
While the standard of review as announced in these recent cases bespeaks a laissez-
faire, hands-off approach to most state classifications, this standard is stricter than the
one espoused as recently as 1969 when the Court stated that a "statutory discrimina-
tion will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it."
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970), quoting McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961). The difference is that the Court will now make a more ex-
tensive inquiry to determine whether there actually is a rational relationship between the
state's classification and the purpose it hopes to achieve. For a discussion of this re-
cent judicial trend, see Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1109 (2d Cir. 1973);
City of New York v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 923, 931 (2d Cir. 1973); Green v. Water-
ford Bd. of Educ., 473 F.2d 629, 633 (2d Cir. 1973); Gunther, The Supreme Court,
1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A
Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 H~Av. L. REv. 1 (1972); Note, The Decline
and Fall of the New Equal Protection: A Polemical Approach, 58 VA. L. REV. 1489
(1972).
46. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
47. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The Court in Plessy stated:
Laws permitting, and even requiring [the separation of the races] in places
where they are liable to be brought into contact db not necessarily imply the
inferiority of either race to the other. . . . The most common instance of
this is connected with the establishment of separate schools for white and
colored children . . . . [W]e cannot say that a law which authorizes or
even requires the separation of the two races in public conveyances is un-
reasonable, or more obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment than the acts
of . .. state legislatures [requiring separate schools for the two races] . .. .
If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the United
States cannot put them upon the same plane. Id. at 544, 550-52.
For an excellent survey of the application of Plessy over the years, see Larson, The
New Law of Race Relations, 1969 Wisc. L. REV. 470, 482 n.27.
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held that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal." 8
The Court's decision was based on the finding-which controverted
the Court's finding in Plessy4 -that
[t]o separate [children in grade and high schools] from others of
similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates
a feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may
affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. 50
This finding was the final step51 in the judicial recognition of the
importance of intangible educational opportunities in the academic and
psychological development of school children.52
A thorough analysis of the Court's opinion, however, reveals the
absence of any attempt to apply either the higher or lower standard
of equal protection review.5 3 This may have been because, in overrul-
ing Plessy, it was simpler for the Court to state its new rule as the
antithesis of the Plessy rule: the fourteenth amendment requires that
public educational facilities, if provided, be provided to all races
equally. The Brown court reasoned that, as long as the races were
48. 347 U.S. at 495.
49. See 163 U.S. at 551.
50. 347 U.S. at 494. The Court also adopted the finding of the federal district
court in Kansas:
Segregation with the sanction of the law . . . has a tendency to [retard]
the educational and mental development of negro children and to deprive
them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated
school system. Id.
The source of that quotation is not apparent from either the Supreme Court or federal
district court opinion. See id.; Brown v. Board of Educ., 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan.
1951).
51. Earlier cases involving segregated law and graduate school facilities recog-
nized that the inequality of intangible factors, e.g., reputation of the school, and op -
portunity to discuss ideas with members of the majority race, were enough to support
a finding that the Negro plaintiffs were denied equal protection of the laws. See
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (graduate school); Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (law school); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada,
305 U.S. 337 (1938) (law school).
52. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 & n.11 (1954).
53. See notes 29-45 supra and accompanying text However, Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, in Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954), the companion case to Brown,
employed the strict standard of review to strike down de jure segregation of public
schools in the District of Columbia. Holding that classifications based on race are
constitutionally suspect and hence must be closely scrutinized, id. at 499, he con-
cluded that "[s]egregation in public education is not reasonably related to any
proper governmental objective . . . ." Id. at 500. Mr. Chief Justice Warren was the
author of both the Brown and Bolling opinions, and one wonders why Brown was not
written in terms of the conventional equal protection analysis employed in Bolling.
The reason is not apparent, although it may have been because Brown was confined by
the logical framework of Plessy since both cases involved instances of state-imposed
segregation; Boiling, on the other hand involved federally-legislated segregation of
public schools, and was not therefore bound by the "separate but equal" parameters.
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required by law to attend separate schools, equal educational facilities
would never be provided to Negro children.
Brown became the seminal case in the field of racial discrimina-
tion in public education,54 including public higher education."5
THE TRIAL DECISION AND APPEAL: SELECTING
THE PROPER STANDARD
After a consideration of the testimony 0 and the arguments, the
trial judge ruled that DeFunis had been denied the equal protection
of the laws because less qualified minority students were admitted
while he was not.57 In holding that a state law school could never
consider race as an independent criterion in its admissions process, the
court cited Brown and held that
54. Although petitioner Brown's counsel expressly rejected the idea of wholesale
invalidation of state segregation laws in other areas purely on the weight of a decision
in that case, see 21 U.S.L.W. 3162 (1952), the Court summarily extended Brown
through a series of per curiam opinions to strike down segregation on public beaches,
Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, affg per curiam 220 F.2d 386 (4th
Cir. 1955); public golf courses, Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, rev'g per
curiam 223 F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955); public buses, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903,
aff'g per curiam 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956); public parks, New Orleans City
Park and Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54, affg per curiam 252 F.2d 122
(5th Cir. 1958); and in the public boxing ring, State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey,
359 U.S. 533 (1959), aff'g per curiam 168 F. Supp. 149 (E.D. La. 1958).
55. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors, 353 U.S. 230 (1957); Florida
ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S. 413 (1956) (per curiam).
56. See note 10 supra. The dean of the law school testified that the preferential
admissions policy was designed to serve the overall educational mission of the school,
and to increase the number of minority lawyers in the profession. In this context
the defendants offered testimony regarding the widespread underrepresentation of
minorities in the profession, and the concomitant need for increased representation.
Andersen at 100. See note 111 infra.
57. The other issues presented to the trial court, and some of the answers given
by the trial judge-the case was tried without a jury-were:
1. What is the appropriate scope of judicial review of an admissions deci-
sion? Andersen at 90. (The Washington Supreme Court discussed this
issue. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d at 25 n.8, 507 P.2d at 1178 n.8.)
2. Is it rational to use LSAT scores at all in cases where the GPA is extremely
high? Yes. Andersen at 90, 108.
3. Is it appropriate in computing the LSAT part of the PFYA to average all
scores? Yes. Id.
4. Was it proper for the law school to use students on the admissions com-
mittee, especially in light of the fact that many of the decisions are at
variance with the strict numerical ranking of the applicants? Yes. Id.
5. Was it proper for the admissions committee to use criteria other than the
strict numerical ranking of the candidates? Yes. Id. at 96-100, 108.6. Are university files and records (except the name of the respective appli-
cant) discoverable? Yes. Id. at 90, 103-04.
7. Does a state-supported school have a legal obligation to grant preference
to qualified resident applicants? No. Id. at 90, 107, 108.




[a]fter that decision the 14th amendment could no longer be stretched
to accommodate the needs of any race. Policies of discrimination
will inevitably lead to reprisals. In my opinion the only safe rule-
is to treat all races alike, and I feel that is what is required under the
equal protection clause.5 8
DeFunis was ordered admitted to the 1971-72 first year class.59
On appeal60 the Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding
58. DeFunis v. Odegaard, No. 741727 (Super. Ct., Sept. 22, 1971) (oral decision)
(reported in Andersen, at 108). The trial judge's entire opinion on the issue is re-
corded as follows:
It seems to me that the law school here wished to achieve greater minor-
ity representation and in accomplishing this gave preference to the members of
some races. In doing this the admissions committee assumed that all mem-
bers of minority races, with the exception of Asians, were deprived persons.
The applications of the Black students were separated from all others and
assigned to a Black student and a professor who had worked closely with the
CLEO program.
Some minority students were admitted whose college grades and aptitude
test scores were so low that had they been whites their applications would
have been summarily denied. Excluding the Asians only one minority stu-
dent out of 31 admitted among the applicants had a predicted first year
average above the plaintiff.
Since no more than 150 applicants were to be admitted the admission of
less qualified [applicants] resulted in a denial of places to those otherwise
qualified. The plaintiff and others in this group have not in my opinion been
accorded the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the 14th amendment.
In 1954 the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion decided that public education must be equally available to all regardless
of race.
This decision was immediately criticized by the president of the university, who
felt that the trial court had misinterpreted the fourteenth amendment:
It is clear that the main issue in this case turns on the interpretation of the
fourteenth amendment . . . as it is applicable to the admission of persons
from educationally disadvantaged backgrounds to higher education. . . . The
fundamental purpose of the university's affirmative action program in ad-
missions is to fulfill the obligation called for by the Fourteenth Amendment
by providing equal educational access to all, including those who have been
educationally disadvantaged. 57 A.B.A.J. 1234 (1971) (statement made on
Sept. 24, 1971).
For other critiques of the trial ruling see Comment, 21 AM. U.L. REv. 736
(1972) (ruling was incorrect); 52 B.U.L. Rav. 304 (1972) (ruling was incorrect);
49 CHr.-KBNT L. Rav. 132 (1972) (ruling has significant precedential support).
59. Andersen at 108. DeFunis had actually already been admitted pursuant to a
temporary injunction issued by the trial judge which enjoined defendants from ad-
mitting any law students "in a number which would preclude the admission of plaintiff,
Marco DeFunis, Jr., to the 1971-72 first year class ... " 82 Wash. 2d at 14, 23 n.6,
507 P.2d at 1172, 1177 n.6.
The law school was faced with a serious dilemma: the specific relief granted
was the order requiring that DeFunis be admitted, not that the law school discontinue
its minority admissions program; the clear holding, however, had been that the pro-
gram was unconstitutional. After much discussion the law school decided to continue
the program into the next year, hoping for a reversal in the state supreme court.
Andersen at 109-10.
60. Several amicus curiae briefs were filed in support of the minority admissions
program, including those of the American Bar Association, the Association of Ameri-
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that the law school's voluntary action in implementing its preferential
admissions program did not violate the fourteenth amendment."
Brown and more recent cases," ' said the court, do not support the
conclusion that considerations of race in implementing an admissions
program are per se invalid under the equal protection clause. 8 Be-
cause race is a suspect classification, however, its use by the admissions
committee as one criterion in evaluating applicants must, in light of
clearly established precedent, 4 be subjected to the higher standard
of equal protection review; the law school must show that the racial
classifications were necessary to further a compelling state interest.05
The Court concluded that the law school had shown at least three
can Law Schools, the Law School Admissions Council, and CLEO, jointly; the Ameri-
can Association of University Professors; the American Indian Law Students As-
sociation; the Black American Law Students Association and Law Students Civil
Rights Research Council, jointly; and the American Civil Liberties Union. Andersen
at 112 n.70.
61. Regarding some of the other issues presented, the Washington Supreme Court
upheld the admission committee's use of non-quantitative criteria, 82 Wash. 2d at 38-42,
507 P.2d at 1185-87; refused to decide whether the LSAT contained an inherent cul-
tural bias, 82 Wash. 2d at 41, 507 P.2d at 1186; and rejected DeFunis' contention that
the law school must give admissions preference to Washington residents, 82 Wash. 2d
at 42-44, 507 P.2d at 1187-8.
A collateral issue which this Note will not fully develop relates to the scope of
the racial classification. "A validly drawn classification is one 'which includes all
[and only those] persons who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the
law."' 82 Wash. 2d at 36, 507 P.2d at 1184, quoting Tussman & tenBroek. The
Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 C.ALip. L. Rv. 341, 346 (1949). The purpose of
the classification, the court found, was to give specific consideration to those minority
groups which are underrepresented in law school and the profession, and which cannot
secure proportionate representation under traditional admissions criteria. In light of
this purpose, the state need not include all racial minorities, but could identify and
seek to correct the most serious racial imbalances without attempting to provide an
immediate solution to the overall problem of equal representation in the legal system.
82 Wash. 2d at 37, 507 P.2d at 1184.
Some commentators disagree with the use of any racial classification to aid the
disadvantaged, arguing instead that the benefits of preferential treatment should be
distributed along economic class lines. See Freund, Civil Rights and the Limits of
Law, 14 BusAI.o L. REV. 199, 204 (1964); Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the
Schools-Part II: The General Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U.L. REv. 157, 207 (1963).
See also Kaplan, supra note 5, at 363, 373-74.
62. The court cited North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43
(1971); Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); and Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254
(3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971).
63. 82 Wash. 2d at 31, 507 P.2d at 1181. See notes 71-89 infra and accom-
panying text.
64. The court cited Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967); and McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
65. 82 Wash. 2d at 31-32, 507 P.2d at 1181-82.
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compelling state interests: (1) an interest in eradicating the contin-
uing effects of past discrimination by promoting integration and reduc-
ing racial imbalance in public education; 6 (2) an interest in producing
a racially balanced student body so that all law students would have
a legal education which would prepare them to deal with the societal
problems which will confront them upon graduation;6 7 and (3) an
interest in reducing the shortage of minority attorneys in the profes-
sion.68
As to the necessity of employing preferential admissions to
achieve those purposes, the court stated that
racial imbalance in the law school and the legal profession is the evil
to be corrected and it can only be corrected by providing legal edu-
cation to those minority groups which have been previously deprived
... [W]e believe the minority admissions policy of the law school
to be the only feasible "plan that promises realistically to work, and
promises realistically to work now."69
Therefore, it concluded, DeFunis was not denied equal protection of
the laws.70
An analysis of the Washington Supreme Court's decision must
66. 82 Wash. 2d at 33-35, 507 P.2d at 1182, 1183.
67. 82 Wash. 2d at 35, 507 P.2d at 1183-84.
68. 82 Wash. 2d at 35, 507 P.2d at 1184.
69. 82 Wash. 2d at 36, 507 P.2d at 1184 (citation omitted). The court consid-
ered, but rejected the argument that these objectives could be achieved by improving
elementary and secondary education of minority students to a point where they could
secure adequate representation in law schools on the basis of the same academic cri-
teria as nonminority applicants:
This would be highly desirable, but 18 years have passed since the decision in
Brown v. Board of Education ... and minority groups are still grossly under-
represented in law schools. If the law school is forbidden from taking af-
firmative action, this underrepresentation may be perpetuated indefinitely. Id.
70. An interesting question is whether DeFunis v. Odegaard is a moot case.
Even though the Washington Supreme Court held that DeFunis was properly denied
admission, the trial court's injunction, see note 59 supra, was not explicitly removed.
DeFunis has not been dismissed, and he is expected to graduate in June, 1974. Letter
from William R. Andersen, Of Counsel for the law school, Sept. 13, 1973. Therefore,
a decision from the United States Supreme Court could well be announced after DeFu-
nis has already received his degree. "To adjudicate a cause which no longer exists is
a proceeding which [the] Court uniformly has declined to entertain." Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Local 419, AFL-CIO, 397 U.S. 655, 657 (1970) (citations omitted).
This issue was not, however, addressed by any of the briefs for appeal or certior-
ari. See Appellant-Petitioners' Brief for Jurisdiction or Certiorari, Appellee-Respon-
dents' Brief for Dismissal of Appeal or Opposition to Certiorari, Brief for Anti-
Defamation League of B'nai B'rith as Amicus Curiae, DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash.




begin with an evaluation of the court's application of the higher stand-
ard of equal protection review in a factual context unlike that in which
the higher standard developed. If that standard was inappropriate,
does precedent exist for the application of the lower standard in such
a case? Before these questions are answered, it is necessary to discuss
a threshold issue which decided the case in the trial court: whether,
under the fourteenth amendment, racial classifications are ever permis-
sible.
THE USE OF RACIAL CRITERIA: IS THE
CONSTITUTION "COLOR-BLIND"?
The argument, accepted by the DeFunis trial court, that race
may never be the basis of a state's classification of persons within
its jurisdiction probably finds its inception in the first Justice Harlan's
sole dissenting opinion in Plessy that "[o]ur Constitution is color-
blind . "... 71 Implicit in that dissent, however, is Justice Harlan's
assumption that racial criteria, if permitted, would always be used
to keep the black American in a condition of legal and social inferior-
ity.72 In context, therefore, Justice Harlan's statement cannot be said
to support the color-blindness standard employed by the DeFunis trial
court. That court cited Brown to support its holding that race could
never be used as a criterion for classification by the state; 78 but the
Brown Court, while adopting Justice Harlan's reasoning that legally
imposed segregation was a badge of inferiority imposed on black
Americans,7 4 made no mention of the color-blindness statement.
Another reason why Brown should not be interpreted as proscrib-
ing all racial classifications, and the reason primarily relied upon by
the Washington Supreme Court, arises from the factual distinction be-
tween Brown and DeFunis: Brown struck down racial classifications
which were being used, and historically always had been used, to dis-
criminate against black Americans. As the Washington Supreme
Court concluded, such was not the case in DeFunis:
[Brown] held that invidious racial classifications-i.e., those that stig-
matize a racial group with the stamp of inferiority-are unconstitutional
71. 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896). The argument is developed further by additional
language in that dissent:
t t .I deny that any legislative body or judicial tribunal may have regard
to th 'race of citizens when the civil rights of those citizens [i.e., the right to
use public railway accommodations] are involved. . . . The law regards man
as man, and takes no account of . .. his color when his civil rights as
guaranteed by the supreme law of the land are involved. id. at 554-55, 559.
72. See 163 U.S. at 560, 562, 563.
73. See note 58 supra and accompanying text.
74. See notes 48-52 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1973:1126
PREFERENTIAL ADMISSIONS
* . "Preferential admissions do not represent a covert attempt to
stigmatize the majority race as inferior; nor is it reasonable to expect
that a possible effect ...will be to stigmatize whites."'75
Brown, then, does not require absolute color-blindness as a prerequisite
to compliance with the equal protection clause.7 6
Recent cases which construe the Brown opinion support the
Washington Supreme Court's holding that racial classifications are not
per se invalid. In Green v. County School Board,77 the Supreme Court
struck down a "freedom of choice" desegregation plan which adopted
a racially neutral approach in which no student was assigned or ad-
mitted to any school on the basis of race. In essence the Court held
that Brown required more than a cessation of segregation; it required
affirmative integration as well. To achieve the conversion from a dual,
segregated school system to a unitary school system, the school board
was charged with an affirmative duty to reduce racial imbalance. 78
The Supreme Court elaborated on its call for affirmative action
from school boards in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Ed-
ucation79 and its companion case, North Carolina State Board of Edu-
cation v. Swann. 0 In the first case, the Court held that in fashioning
a unitary system under the precepts of Green, a school board need
not be "color-blind" but may consider race as a valid criterion.
As we said in Green, a school authority's remedial plan or a district
court's remedial decree is to be judged by its effectiveness. Awareness
of the racial composition of the whole school system is likely to be a
useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct past constitutional
violations. 81
75. 82 Wash. 2d at 27, 507 P.2d at 1179 (emphasis added), quoting O'Neil,
supra note 1, at 713.
76. The exact meaning of the Brown decision has been the subject of extensive
debate but most commentators agree that, while Brown did not sanction the use of
ameliorative racial classifications, neither did it adopt the view that racial classifica-
tions were per se invalid. See, e.g., Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The
Constitutional Concepts, 78 HA.v. L. REv. 564, 594 (1965); Goldman, Benign Racial
Classifications: A Constitutional Dilemma, 35 U. CINN. L. Rav. 349, 362 (1966);
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HIv. L. REV. 1, 32
(1959); Comment, Alternative Schools for Minority Students: The Constitution, The
Civil Rights Act and the Berkeley Experiment, 61 CALiF. L. RFov. 858, 870-73 (1973).
77. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
78. The "freedom of choice" plan was not unconstitutional per se, but it was not
as effective as other available methods of abolishing the segregated school system.
Id. at 440-41.
79. 402 U.S. 1 (1971). Swann upheld the power of the federal district court
to prescribe wide-scale intra-district busing to achieve a unitary, integrated school
system.
80. 402 U.S. 43 (1971).
81. 402 U.S. at 25.
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In the companion case, the Supreme Court invalidated a North
Carolina statute which prohibited involuntary busing of students in
order to create racial balance.8 2  On its face the law absolutely forbade
the use of racial classifications in student assignment. The Court con-
cluded, however, that although
the statute exploits an apparently neutral form to control school assign-
ment plans by directing that they be "color blind" [,J that requirement
.. . would render illusory the promise of Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion . . . . Just as the race of students must be considered in deter-
mining whether a constitutional violation has occurred, so also must
race be considered in formulating a remedy.8 3
The most recent affirmation of the Court's rejection of the color-
blindness standard may be found in Keyes v. School District No. 1,84
the Denver school desegregation case. There the majority, in answer
to a point made by Justice Rehnquist in his dissent, 5 stated that Green
was the controlling case, not Brown, and that the school could not
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 115-176.1 (Supp. 1971), known as the Anti-Busing Law,
read in pertinent part:
No student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school on ac-
count of race, creed, color or national origin, or for the purpose of creating a
balance or ratio of race, religion, or national origins. Involuntary busing of
students in contravention of this article is prohibited, and public funds shall
not be used for any such busing.
83. 402 U.S. at 45-46. Professor Alexander Bickel, in the amicus brief submitted
on behalf of B'nai B'rith, see note 4 supra, argued that Green and Swann cannot be
construed to sanction racial classifications in a preferential admissions context. He
contended that these cases allowed the use of racial criteria only because it was neces-
sary to irradicate the effects of state-imposed segregation, and that there was no alle-
gation or history of state-imposed segregation in DeFunis. See Brief for Anti-Defama-
tion League, supra note 70, at 12-14. This argument, however, overlooks the underly-
ing purpose of Green, Swann, and similar desegregation cases: to bring public educa-
tion into line with the basic precepts of the fourteenth amendment. Since this is
exactly the purpose of the law school's minority admissions program, see notes 106-11
infra and accompanying text, Green and Swann are valid precedent for holding that
ameliorative racial classifications are not per se invalid.
84. 93 S. Ct. 2686 (1973). Keyes involved a situation in which the school board,
through various devices, had engaged in segregative practices aimed at minority stu-
dents in one section of the school district. In the inner city, where schools were pre-
dominantly attended by minority students, the school board had not been shown to
have engaged in discriminatory practices, and the segregation that existed was appar-
ently of a de facto nature. The Supreme Court held that the existence of identifiably
minority schools, coupled with the history of discrimination in other parts of the dis-
trict, gave rise to a presumption that the inner city segregation was de jure. The
burden was then on the school board "to adduce proof sufficient to support a finding
that segregative intent was not among the factors that motivated their actions" involv-
ing the inner city schools. Id. at 2698.
85. Id. at 2722. Mr. Justice Rehnquist distinguished the Keyes situation from
that presented in Green on the ground that in Green the school board had for years
rigidly excluded Negroes from white schools.
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remain racially neutral in fulfilling its duty to establish a unitary, deseg-
regated school system. "
It may be concluded, therefore, that, regardless of the original
meaning of Brown,"7 the United States Supreme Court has decided
that racial classifications are not per se violative of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 88  The Washington Supreme
Court was therefore correct in overturning the simplistic decision of the
trial court in DeFunis.89
86. Id. at 2693-94 n.11. The manner in which Mr. Justice Rehnquist presented
his argument, see id. at 2722, and the manner in which it was rejected by the majority
indicates the waning utility of Brown in contemporary desegregation situations. Brown
has now taken its rightful place as the cornerstone of an increasingly complex consti-
tutional edifice built by twenty years of judicial construction.
87. See notes 73-76 supra and accompanying text.
88. The federal courts of appeals in over half the judicial circuits have arrived at
the same conclusion in a variety of factual contexts. See Carter v. Gallagher, 452
F.2d 315, 331 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (it is within the
equitable power of a federal district court to set minority-majority hiring ratios as a
means of eliminating the effects of past invidious discrimination); Porcelli v. Titus,
431 F.2d 1254, 1257 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (1971) (appointment of
school administrators "based partly on considerations of color, when color is not used
per se, and in furtherance of a proper governmental objective, is not necessarily a vio-
lation of the Fourteenth Amendment"); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment
Agency, 395 F.2d 920, 932 (2d Cir. 1968) (although the Constitution usually forbids
racial classification, "where it is drawn for the purpose of achieving equality [in
housing relocation] it will be allowed .... "); Offerman v. Nitkowski, 378 F.2d 22,
24 (2d Cir. 1967) (school board may adopt racial criteria in implementing a volun-
tary plan of eliminating de facto segregation. "What is prohibited is use of race as a
basis for unequal treatment"); Brooks v. Beto, 366 F.2d 1, 24 (5th Cir. 1966), cert.
denied, 386 U.S. 975 (1967) (race may be considered in selection of juries if the
effect is to foster the eradication of former discrimination); Wanner v. County
School Bd., 357 F.2d 452, 454 (4th Cir. 1966) (when a school board voluntarily un-
dertakes a desegregation plan, its efforts are not to be frustrated on the ground that
race is not a permissible consideration because "[tihis is not the 'consideration of
race' which the Constitution discountenances"); Springfield School Comm. v. Barks-
dale, 348 F.2d 261, 266 (1st Cir. 1965) (a school committee may implement a vol-
untary desegregation plan using racial criteria because that action "does not concern
race except insofar as race correlates with proven deprivation of educational oppor-
tunity"). Cf. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
89. Although the trial court and the Washington Supreme Court concentrated on
Brown and its progeny regarding the validity of race as a criterion, the other line of
race cases, those involved in the development of the strict standard of review, also sup-
port the conclusion that racial classifications are not per se invalid: in two of these
cases concurring Justices maintained that the racial classifications involved were per se
invalid, but the majority never adopted this view. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 13
(1967) (Stewart, J., concurring); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 198 (1964)
(Stewart & Douglas, J.J., concurring).
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THE HIGHER STANDARD OF REVIEW: ARE AMELIORATIVE
CLASSIFICATIONS SUSPECT?
In determining the appropriate standard of review to apply to
the law school's minority admissions program, the Washington Su-
preme Court relied mainly on three cases9" which had stated that racial
classifications were suspect, and should consequently receive strict
scrutiny. The defendants had suggested that the lower, rational basis
standard should apply because the racial classifications made in De-
Funis, unlike those attacked in the cases which originally declared
race a suspect classification, were not for the purpose of stigmatizing
minority groups, but rather for the purpose of benefiting those persons
still suffering the effects of a long history of racial discrimination.0 '
The court summarily dismissed this argument, however, observing that
the racial classifications drawn by the law school were "certainly not
benign with respect to nonminority students" denied admission."2
While the Washington Supreme Court was correct in reading the cited
decisions to mean that race had always been considered a suspect
criterion, it failed to point out that all of those cases were decided
against a background of invidious discrimination against minority
groups. This is not to say that the entire body of suspect-classification
cases should be summarily distinguished on the facts, but the factual
difference in DeFunis certainly requires a threshold inquiry to determine
whether the factors which have made racial classifications suspect in
the past are characteristic of ameliorative racial classifications. If not,
the Court should not blindly follow precedent and apply the higher
standard of review in a situation where application of that standard
may actually thwart the purposes for which it was developed.
The inquiry can be broken down into two parts: (1) Why has
the Supreme Court labeled some classifications "suspect" and applied
to them the higher standard of review? (2) Do the reasons for denom-
inating some classifications "suspect" support the application of that
label to racial classifications used in a preferential admissions program?
90. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
91. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d at 32, 507 P.2d at 1182.
92. Id. The court would have made a much clearer statement of its reasoning if
it had phrased its observation in terms of "preferential treatment" or "ameliorative
classification," instead of "benign classification." See note 6 supra. As it stands,
however, the court immediately foreclosed a line of inquiry into the true nature of an
ameliorative racial classification, and thereby failed adequately to justify its refusal to
apply the rational-basis standard of review.
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Suspect Classifications: Parameters and Definitions
One explanation for the Supreme Court's decision that some cri-
teria are constitutionally suspect when used by the state to classify
persons under its jurisdiction emerges from language the Court has
used in various cases over the past thirty years. This recurring theme
is that a criterion is suspect if it is irrelevant to any legitimate state
objective 3 or to the ability of an individual to perform in and con-
tribute to society. 4 The underlying argument is that if a criterion
is actually irrelevant to a permissible state objective use of such a
criterion will result in purely arbitrary classifications. Not every arbi-
trary classification is suspect; the Court has commonly employed the
rational-basis standard to evaluate non-suspect but arbitrary classifica-
tions."' Rather, the Court has been concerned with those arbitrary
classifications which historically have repeatedly been drawn because
of some irrelevant but easily recognizable trait such as black skin.
The use of race as a criterion has been a major concern of the
Supreme Court if only because that criterion has been used over and
over by the states in fashioning classifications which stigmatized racial
minorities, relegating them to a position of legal and social inferiority
and isolating them from the political and social decision-making proc-
esses which are supposed to consider their rights and needs. 96 This
judicial concern is evidenced by the oft-repeated statement that
[t]he clear and central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to
eliminate all official state sources of invidious racial discrimination
97
Racial classifications are especially abhorrent because they are based
on inherent, immutable personal traits which, though genetically no
accident, are completely beyond the control of the stigmatized group.98
Against this historical background of invidious discrimination
against racial minorities, the Court developed a standard of review
which made it almost impossible for the state to justify the use of
93. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964); Hirabayashi v.
United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100-01 (1943).
94. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973), citing Developments
at 1173-74.
95. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
96. For a legal historian's view of the efforts of states to stigmatize and isolate
black Americans see Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE
L.J. 421 (1960).
97. E.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 236 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (emphasis supplied).




a racial classification. The first suggestion that a higher standard
of review might be needed appeared in a footnote written by Justice Stone
speaking for a plurality of the Court in United States v. Carolene
Products Co.99 Justice Stone suggested that some types of state legisla-
tion might, under the fourteenth amendment, be denied the usual
presumption of constitutional validity, and might be subjected to "more
exacting judicial scrutiny" than other types of legislation. Included
in the types of legislation which might be more closely examined were
statutes directed at racial or national minorities: 100
[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities,
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial
inquiry.101
This footnote did not receive the support of a majority of the Court,
and it was not expressly relied on in subsequent racial discrimination
cases; but the concepts announced in that footnote have been continu-
ally expressed in later cases which sought to insure that the efforts
of minority groups to secure fair representation in the decision-making
process were protected by a higher standard of review.0 2 The contin-
99. 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
100. Id. at 153 n.4. Other types of legislation were restrictions on the right to
vote, restraints upon dissemination of information, interferences with political organi-
zations, prohibitions of peaceable assembly, and statutes directed at particular religious
minorities. Id. at 152-53 n.4.
101. Id. at 153 n.4.
102. See Hadnott v. Amos, 394 U.S. 358, 361-64 (1969) (enforcement of election
filing statute which excluded Negroes, but not similarly situated whites, from candidacy
violated fourteenth amendment); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391-93 (1969)
(city charter amendment violated the fourteenth amendment because it made it more
difficult for minorities to enact legislation in their behalf); Louisiana v. United States,
380 U.S. 145, 151-53 (1965) (state could not enforce a literacy clause in a manner
which arbitrarily deprived Negroes of the right to vote); Virginia Bd. of Elections v.
Hamm, 379 U.S. 19, affg per curiam, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964) (affirm-
ance of lower court opinion which held that the compulsory listing of qualified
voters by their race tended to separate individuals by race alone and was therefore
.violative of the fourteenth amendment); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 401-04
(1964) (compulsory designation by Louisiana of the race of the candidate on the
ballot acted to encourage racial prejudice and therefore violated the fourteenth amend-
ment). Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1967) (anti-miscegenation statute
violated fourteenth amendment because it sought to perpetuate white supremacy);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-27 (1960) (compulsory disclosure of
NAACP membership lists violated fourteenth amendment due process because it vio-
lated Negroes' right to associate for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing griev-
ances); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (right of Negroes to associate
must be held inviolate because effective advocacy of public and private points of
view is a guarantee of the fourteenth amendment due process clause).
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ning validity of Justice Stone's footnote is evidenced in a recent line
of cases involving state classifications based on alienage. There the
Court has relied in part on that footnote for its position that
aliens, as a "discrete and insular" minority, warrant "heightened judi-
cial solicitude" so that their rights might be fully protected.10 3
From this background it is possible to suggest a definition of
"suspect classification": it is one which is based on a readily identifi-
able, usually immutable characteristic, and one which the Court suspects
is being used by a state against a politically impotent minority group
to keep members of this group in an inferior position and to isolate
them from the political process. 104 If a state classification has one
of these purposes or effects, the Court will apply the higher standard
of review.'05
Ameliorative Racial Classifications: Do They Fit?
The remaining question is whether the racial classification em-
It is interesting to note that the Court has concurrently sought to insure proper
minority representation in the criminal process. See, e.g., Alexander v. Louisiana,
405 U.S. 625, 628-32 (1972) (state bore heavy burden of showing that progressive
elimination of Negroes during grand jury selection process was not caused by invidi-
ous discrimination).
103. In re Griffiths, 93 S. Ct. 2851, 2854-55 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 93
S. Ct. 2842, 2847 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971).
104. It has been strongly argued in recent years that criteria other than race,
alienage and national origin should be considered "suspect." In San Antonio Inde-
pendent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), the lower court had held that
wealth was a suspect classification. 337 F. Supp. 280, 282-83 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
The Supreme Court declined to hold specifically that wealth was not a suspect clas-
sification, but held that any discrimination in the factual situations before it had not
been based on wealth. The issue remains, therefore, whether the Court will ever
designate wealth a suspect classification. In some respects, wealth fits the definition
here suggested: the poor are usually a politically-impotent group and are generally
excluded from the mainstream of political life. On the other hand, poverty is not,
theoretically, an immutable characteristic. On the contrary, basic to our American
ideology is the concept of upward economic mobility.
It has also been argued that sex is a suspect criterion, and the arguments have
convinced four members of the Supreme Court. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
682-88 (1973) (Brennan, J., for the plurality). Four other Justices in that case relied
on Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), which had struck down a classification based
on sex without holding that sex was a suspect classification. Sex, like wealth, also
has both suspect and non-suspect characteristics under the suggested definition: sex is
certainly an immutable trait, and women as a class have traditionally been poorly rep-
resented in the political process; however, women do not presently constitute a minor-
ity.
105. Ancillary support for the proposition that only invidiously discriminatory
racial classifications are suspect may be found in a recent Supreme Court footnote
explaining why the higher standard of review was not employed in that case. See
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 n.17 (1970).
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ployed in the DeFunis case should be considered suspect, and conse-
quently subjected to the higher standard of review. This inquiry might
begin by asking whether the law school's ameliorative racial classifi-
cation is relevant either to any legitimate state objective or to the abilities
of the persons so classified to function in the law school environment.
If the classification is not relevant, it is purely arbitrary and might
be considered constitutionally suspect. The obvious answer is that
the law school's classification is clearly relevant to a valid state pur-
pose. The purpose of the racial classification in DeFunis is to reduce
racial imbalance in the law school and in the legal profession. That
the reduction of racial imbalance is a permissible state objective is
reflected in the lower court decisions upholding affirmative state action
plans'0 6 and in earlier Supreme Court decisions which explicitly or
implicitly recognized the value of educational intercourse among the
races.' 07 The relevance of the racial classification is also apparent:
if the racial imbalance is to be reduced, the law school must be aware
of, and must consider, the race of each applicant. 108
The second part of the inquiry must ask whether the state, in
using the racial classification, is attempting to place members of minor-
ity races in positions of legal or social inferiority or to keep them
out of the political process. A strong argument can be made
that the law school's objectives in using the classification are ex-
actly the reverse. The purpose of the admissions program is to
aid disadvantaged minority applicants in becoming members of a
highly respected profession, and the immediate effect of the racial
classification is to place minority applicants in an admissions posture
superior to some white applicants. While it has been suggested that
singling out minority members for any special treatment may have
a stigmatizing effect,1 9 the basic premise of Brown and its progeny
was that a reduction of racial imbalance in public educational institu-
tions will reduce, not increase, the stigmatization of minorities."10 Fur-
ther, rather than insulating minorities from the political process, the
law school, in using the racial classification, seeks to increase their
ability to participate therein. Lawyers have traditionally been the lead-
106. See note 88 supra.
107. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
108. This is the same type of reasoning adopted by the Court in Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See note 81 supra and accompanying
text.
109. See note 113 infra.
110. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.
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ers in the business and political community, and any racial classifica-
tion that promises to increase the number of minority lawyers conse-
quently promises to provide greater protection to the rights, and closer
attention to the needs, of minorities.1 1
From the preceding discussion it is clear that the ameliorative
racial classifications used in the law school's admissions process do
not have the characteristics which have caused the Supreme Court
to denominate racial classifications "suspect" in the past and, therefore,
should not be subjected to the higher standard of review. It would
be ironic indeed if a standard of review which was developed to
help end discrimination against members of minority groups were
used to ban state practices designed to alleviate the effects of that
very discrimination.
If the higher standard of review is inappropriate for application to
ameliorative racial classifications, the alternative is the "lower" stand-
ard of review, the "rational-basis" test. Several objections have been
made to this alternative, but none outweigh the basic lack of logic
involved in the application of the higher standard to ameliorative racial
classifications.
111. The gross underrepresentation of minorities in law schools, and consequently
in the legal profession, is a well-documented fact, and the figures are startling. As
of 1968, it was estimated that only 200 law graduates out of 10,000 were black; pro-
portionate representation would have been around 1200 out of 10,000. Gellhorn,
The Law Schools and the Negro, 1968 DUKE L.J. 1069, 1077. From 1965-68 the
University of Georgia enrolled only one black law student, and the University of
Alabama law school, which had never graduated a Negro, had none. Id. at 1081.
Moreover, this phenomenon was not confined to the South: in 1971 Cornell Uni-
versity had only 7 Negro law students out of 460; University of Cincinnati, 7 out of
352; University of Chicago, 14 out of 475; University of Missouri, 1 out of 420; Stan-
ford University, 10 out of 504. ABA-LAw STUDENT DIVISION, EQUAL RIGHTS PROJECT
REPORT, at 12, 24, 28, 31, 36 (1971). The numbers are increasing due to recently
instituted minority recruitment programs, see id. at 68-92, but a recent survey of over
100 law schools showed that for the 1970-71 academic year only about 4.5% of en-
rolled law students were members of any minority group. Id.
As of 1971, only 4300 of the 350,000 lawyers in the United States were black.
Comment, supra note 58, at 752 n.91. In 1968 only 9 out of almost 1 million Negroes
in Mississippi practiced law; only 20 in Alabama; and only 34 out of Georgia's 5500
lawyers were black. Gellhorn, supra, at 1074. As of 1971 only 10 out of 357,000
Negroes in Arkansas, and only 11 out of 789,000 in South Carolina, were lawyers.
Comment, supra note 58, at 752 n.91. Through 1968 no American Indian had ever
graduated from the law school at the University of Utah, Arizona, or New Mexico,
and no Indian was practicing law in the last two states, which had a combined Ameri-
can Indian population of 135,000. Id. In 1967, Denver, with a 9% Chicano Ameri-
can population, could count only 10 Chicano lawyers out of its 2000-member bar.
Id. at 753 n.92.
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APPLICATION OF THE LOWER
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Many arguments have been made which imply that the use of
a lenient standard to review ameliorative racial classifications would
be inappropriate: (1) such classifications offend fundamental notions
of individualism by seeking to aid groups instead of individuals;"v2
(2) they promote private color consciousness and further stigmatize
those minorities selected for special treatment;113 (3) they could be
abused to impose more invidious discrimination on minorities;114 (4)
they discriminate against other disadvantaged classes not selected for
the group receiving preferential treatment;1 5 (5) and they may be
used to establish strict racial quotas both cumbersome to administer
and unfair to many parties involved, both minority and nonminority.110
These objections appear to be based on the assumption that the lower
standard of review is simply not adequate to insure that preferential
treatment programs accomplish their ameliorative objectives while
avoiding possible misuses and pitfalls. Apparently the feeling is that
if the Court applies the rational-basis standard, every allegedly ameli-
orative racial classification will summarily be held constitutional.
It is true that for many years the Court's decisions as to the
applicable standard was dispositive of the case, because, if the lower
standard was used, a rational relation between the classification and
some permissible state purpose was always found. But the Court has
recently begun to examine classifications more carefully under the
lower standard to see whether the required rational relationship really
exists." :7 No longer is the presumption of validity dispositive of the
case. Under the lower standard, the Court would now make a rea-
soned inquiry into whether there is a permissible state purpose, and
whether the ameliorative racial classification is reasonably related to
the accomplishment of that purpose.
112. Developments at 1111-12.
113. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 376, 378, 379-80; O'Neil, supra note 1, at 710;
Summers, Preferential Admissions: An Unreal Solution to a Real Problem, 1970 U.
TOL. L. Rnv. 377, 395-97; Vieira, Racial Imbalance, Black Separatism, and Permissible
Classification by Race, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1553, 1614-15 (1969); Developments at
1112-13.
114. See O'Neil, supra note 1, at 710; Vieira, supra note 113, at 1611-12; Devel-
opments at 1115-16.
115. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 375, 377; Vieira, supra note 113, at 1613-15;
Developments at 1119-20.
116. See Kaplan, supra note 5, at 400-04; Vieira, supra note 113, at 1612; Develop-
ments at 1117-19.
117. See note 45 supra.
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Lingering doubts about the amenability of ameliorative racial
classifications to rational-basis review are allayed by the fact that the
Supreme Court has very recently used a rational-basis approach to
strike down state rules based on alienage, which, like race, has tradi-
tionally been considered suspect. In Sugarman v. Dougall,11 the
Court, while purporting to use the higher standard of review,"19
struck down a section of the New York Civil Service Law based
on alienage1 20 because the classification so drawn was too imprecisely
related to a valid state interest.' 21 Again, in In re Griffiths22 the
Court cited the state's obligation under the strict scrutiny standard, '
-2 3
but then held that the state bar examiners' rule precluding aliens from
the practice of law was not rationally related to the achievement of
an admittedly substantial state objective.'2 4
Under the rational-basis standard as it is now employed, the law
school's preferential admissions program would be approved. The
purpose is certainly permissible.'2 5  The harder question is whether
a preferential admissions program is rationally related to that purpose
in light of the available alternatives, such, as improving the quality
of elementary and secondary school so that minority members might
compete for law school admissions under traditional standards, or es-
tablishing preferential admissions programs in undergraduate schools
only. The Washington Supreme Court rejected the first alternative
as unreasonable because almost twenty years have passed since Brown
ordered that black children be allowed to attend white schools, and
minorities are still grossly underrepresented in law schools.'2 6 The
118. 93 S. Ct. 2842 (1973).
119. Id. at 2847.
120. Laws of New York, 1939, ch. 767, § 1, provided: "[N]o person shall be
eligible for appointment for any position in the competitive class unless he is a citizen
of the United States." The "competitive class" included all positions for which a com-
petitive examination was given to determine an applicant's relative fitness. Sugarman v.
Dougall, 93 S. Ct. at 2846.
121. 93 S. Ct. at 2848. The Court recognized that the state had a valid interest in
setting up its own government, and in limiting participation therein to those within
the basic conception of a political community. Id.
122. 93 S. Ct. 2851 (1973).
123. Id. at 2854-55.
124. Id. at 2855-56. The Court stated that the state had a substantial interest in
insuring the requisite qualifications for members of the bar.
The willingness of the Court in Sugarman and Griffiths to jumble and mix the
elements of the higher and lower standards of review, may signal the Court's con-
tinuing dissatisfaction with a rigidly-structured two-tiered standard of review, and the
continuing demise of that two-level standard. See Gunther, supra note 45.
125. See notes 110-11 supra, and accompanying text.
126. 82 Wash. 2d at 36, 507 P.2d at 1184.
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second alternative is also unfeasible because the mere increase in
minority undergraduates has not by itself significantly increased the num-
ber of minority students accepted to law schools.1 27 A preferential ad-
missions program sponsored by the law school would therefore seem to
be the best available means of accomplishing the permissible state pur-
pose.
CONCLUSION
The law and practice of race relations is constantly changing;
racial classifications are no longer always invidious; states are striving
to fulfill the purposes of the fourteenth amendment after more than
a century of delay. The Supreme Court should acknowledge these
changes by recognizing the difference between the traditional racial
classifications which sought to perpetuate Jim Crow, and those like
the University of Washington law school's which seek to lay Jim
Crow in his grave. DeFunis v. Odegaard provides the Supreme
Court with an excellent opportunity to further refine the definition
of "suspect classification" and to announce that not all classifications
are suspect. Those who affirmatively seek to erase the effects of past
discrimination and thereby achieve the clear purposes of the fourteenth
amendment should not be denied their goal through the misapplica-
tion of a legal concept which was never intended to apply in such
a situation.
127. See Gellhorn, supra note 111, at 1081. Cf. O'Neil, supra note 1, at 721.
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